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ABSTRACT 
Buy-one-get-one-free (BOGOF) promotions are a common feature of retail food markets, but why are they so wide- 
spread? The theory of Relative Utility Pricing (RUP) developed in this paper provides an explanation not only for su- 
permarket promotional offers but also for more general pricing of packs of different sizes in supermarkets and on the 
internet. A clear and simple explanation is given for the two most widely used quantity promotions: BOGOF and 
3-for-the-price-of-2. The RUP model may be linked to the theory of iso-elastic utility functions, and this allows the re- 
lationships amongst risk-aversion, pack-size ratio and demand elasticity to be explored. “Cautious consumers”, as de- 
fined in the paper, are found to be the only sensible target for quantity promotions. It is argued that the needs of cau- 
tious consumers of retail commodities will be best addressed if the vendor sets the ratio of successive pack sizes as the 
square of the Golden Ratio, namely 2.62, and the price-ratio at the Golden Ratio, 1.62. Thus the Golden Ratio may be 
regarded as a marketing guide for vendors considering both their best interests and those of their customers. This 
proposition is supported by an analysis showing that higher profits are more likely to come from Golden Ratio sizing 
than from either BOGOF or 3-for-2 when variable costs lie in most of the upper half of the range that is required for any 
of these multibuy offers to generate profit. The paper’s theoretical predictions for both pack sizes and prices are sup-
ported by examples from the retail sector: grocery, paperback books and electronics. 
 
Keywords: Relative Utility Pricing; Golden Ratio Pricing; Buy One Get One Free; Multibuy Promotions; Utility  
Theory 
1. Introduction 
Retailers often offer products in packs of different sizes, 
whether it is a food product, electronics or clothing. 
Moreover, multibuy promotions such as buy-one-get- 
one-free (BOGOF) are common, but why are they so 
widespread? 
Put formally, the research questions addressed by this 
paper are as follows. Suppose that a pack larger than the 
entry-level pack is offered, what price will the vendor 
need to charge in order to convince the consumer that he 
or she should buy it? Then if further, larger packs are put 
on the market, what prices will the vendor need to set in 
order to sell these? What effect will the relative sizes of 
the packs have on the reaction of the consumers? Finally, 
how can the retailer maximise his profit given the atti- 
tudes of the consumer. 
2. Background 
In his 2008 article in The Daily Telegraph, the Consumer 
Affairs Editor revealed that “more than 80% of all pro- 
motional activity within supermarkets is a bogof [buy- 
one-get-one-free] or three-for-two” [1]. So concerned is 
the UK Government about the success of such promo- 
tions applied to food that it is considering banning mul- 
tibuy deals in an effort to tackle obesity [2].   
But there has long been puzzlement about vendors’ 
motivation in offering quantity promotions. Back in 1984, 
the Wall Street Journal carried a front-page article stating 
that: “The dark secrets of packaging aren’t always easy 
to unwrap. While the issue of how much product a com- 
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pany should put in a box, bottle or tube is about as basic 
as any in business, it also can be fraught with complexi- 
ties” [3]; see also [4]. 
Tabarrok [5] in his response to Pressler [6] suggests 
that BOGOFs “generally increase total welfare because 
the price on the last unit sold is pushed closer to marginal 
cost and because of this output expands”. Certainly, it is 
relatively easy to understand how vendors will profit 
from the selling of larger packs of the same good when 
the marginal cost associated with the extra amount of 
good is small compared with the fixed costs the retail 
outlet has to bear (e.g. [7]). 
Nevertheless worries have been expressed for some 
time in academic journals that BOGOF-type promotions 
might lead people to endanger their health through over- 
eating, e.g. [8]. While, according to Wallop, the distinc- 
tion between perishable and non-perishable goods means 
that BOGOFs in supermarkets “are almost twice as 
popular in the toiletries aisles as in the meat or vegetable 
section”, the same restraint on food offerings does not 
carry over to fast-food chains. Here Dobson and Gerstner 
[8] confirm that “supersizing” food portions and offering 
the larger size at “only a few cents more” than the regular 
portion can be profitable for the vendor, but claim that 
this may be harmful to the health of the consumer and, 
moreover, create economic inefficiencies. 
However, no satisfactory economic explanation has 
been available until now for the reaction of the consumer 
to the multibuy promotions. It is thus necessary to pro- 
vide a quantitative explanation for how the larger packs 
should be sized and priced if the consumer is to be in- 
duced to buy a quantity greater than that contained in the 
standard size, and the logic of these promotions needs to 
be understood when restrictions are contemplated by the 
authorities.   
The problem is a general one, applying to retail outlets 
including supermarkets, restaurants, public houses, fast- 
food stores and internet shopping. It also features in 
market surveys where the respondent is asked to set a 
price on different options.  
The first part of the paper (up to and including Section 
8) will be devoted to developing a model to explain 
quantitatively the prices consumers will expect for dif- 
ferent pack sizes. Utility theory will be used in Sections 3, 
4 and 5 to develop the general Relative Utility Pricing 
(RUP) model, applicable where product differentiation is 
low and the goods may be regarded as commodities. The 
model developed provides, inter alia, a theoretical ex- 
planation for quantity discounts. 
Section 6 develops the RUP model for the common 
case where, when deliberating whether or not to buy 
pack n, the customer chooses to compare its benefit with 
the benefit he would gain by buying pack 1n  . This 
leads to the Single Comparison Relative Utility Pricing 
model (SCRUP). The results of this model are surprise- 
ingly simple, and provide a complete explanation of why 
the retailer will find it necessary to offer buy-one-get- 
one-free (BOGOF) or 3-for-the-price-of-2 promotions. 
Put colloquially, people will expect “to get n but pay 
1n  ”. The theoretical results are used in Section 7 to 
explain some actual prices achieved in supermarkets and 
on the internet, including in cases where the explanation 
for the pack size and price structure is non-obvious. 
Section 8 compares the price per unit produced by the 
SCRUP model with that produced by applying an iso- 
elastic utility function. It is shown that the natural targets 
for multibuy promotions are cautious consumers, who 
have a risk-aversion between 0.0 and 1.0. A link is de- 
veloped between pack size and the average risk-aversion 
amongst cautious consumers, which leads to the notion 
of Golden Ratio Pricing. Here the price quotient of suc- 
cessive packs ratio is the golden ratio while the pack-size 
ratio is the square of that figure. 
Then, in Section 9, an analysis will be made of how 
the retailer may design his pack 2 offering so as to 
maximise his profit while satisfying his customers’ re- 
quirements on price and volume. It will be shown how 
the retailer may use the knowledge of his variable costs 
to maximise his profit in his choice of which multibuy 
offer to make: BOGOF, or 3-for-2 or the new promotion 
suggested in this paper, Golden Ratio Pricing. 
3. The Utility of Packs of Different Sizes 
Consider a basic good, B, that is offered for sale in a 
number of differently sized packs identified by index, j, 
with 0,1,2, , , , , ,j k n N    , where j = 0 signifies 
the empty pack – no purchase is made – and the index, j, 
increases with pack size. Thus  indicates the 
smallest, entry-level pack, while pack N is the largest 
pack on sale. The indices, k and n, with 
1j
k n , have 
been introduced to facilitate later comparisons between a 
general pack, n, and a pack, k, that is strictly smaller. The 
maximum ranges of the three indices, j, k and n are: 
0
0
1
j N
k N
n N
1
 
  
 
               (1) 
The amount of good, B, in the world may be very large 
indeed, but we shall be concerned normally with small 
amounts, b, measured in some unit of extent, for example 
mass or volume or an entirely different measure, such as 
gigabytes of memory on a USB memory stick. 
Let pack j contain an amount, jb , of B, where, as 
noted above, 0 0b   and 1j j  for b b  Nj 1 . We 
will define the largeness, L(j), of pack j as its size relative 
to the entry-level pack 1: 
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 
1
for 0j
b
L j j N
b
            (2) 
Thus the largeness of pack j is the number of standard 
units that pack j contains, where a standard unit com- 
prises the contents of pack 1, namely . Hence 
 and .  
1b 0 0L   1 1L 
Kahneman and Tversky [9] have argued that “people 
normally perceive outcomes as gains and losses [relative 
to the current asset position], rather than as final states of 
wealth or welfare”, a proposition supported by Thaler 
[10]. This approach of measuring the utility of the 
change in the stock level rather than the utility of the 
absolute value of the stock is adopted in this paper, and 
leads to a consideration of the utility of the contents of 
the pack. Thus the utility of the empty pack, with con- 
tents 0  will be , the utility of the contents of 
pack 1, namely 1 , will be 
0b   0u b
b  1u b , and, in general, the 
purchase of pack j will result in a utility,  ju b .  
Consider the case where the vendor is offering just two 
packs: pack 1, with contents, 1 , and a bigger pack, let 
us call it pack x, with contents, 1 . We will assume 
that the price of the entry-level pack, pack 1, has been 
accepted by purchasers as 1 , implying that these con- 
sumers will have a maximum acceptable price (MAP) of 
at least 1 . (See [11] and [12] for a discussion of the 
concept of maximum acceptable price and probability 
distributions.)  
b
16b
p
p
Let us select one of these purchasers with a MAP of 
1  or higher, who buys one standard pack. We may give 
him the name, “consumer X”. Meanwhile there may be 
another person, say consumer Y, who has a MAP of 1  
or higher and also a need or strong desire for 1 . Be- 
cause no larger pack is offered, he will have no option 
but to buy two of the standard packs, which will cost him 
.  
p
2 p
p
2b
1
Suppose now that the vendor withdraws the existing 
pack 1 and replaces it with a new pack 1, which contains 
1 . Consumer X will be put in a quandary, but con- 
sumer Y, whose MAP is at least 1 , will be indifferent 
to this change, and will be content to continue paying 
1  for the same amount of the good, B, now contained 
in the new pack 1.  
2b
2 p
p
Let us now transfer our attention to a person, let us call 
him consumer Z, with a MAP of 1  or more who has a 
need or strong desire for 1 . Consumer Z would need 
initially to buy 4 of pack 1 at 1  each, then, after the 
vendor’s doubling of the size of pack 1, would be content 
to buy 2 of new pack 1 at 1  each, making his total 
outlay 1 . Moreover, it would make no difference to 
him if new pack 1 were supplanted by a further revised 
pack 1 with contents, 1 , and price . His total bill 
remains the same in all cases. 
p
p
4b
2 p
4 p
4b 14 p
Now suppose that the original pack 1 containing  is 
reinstated, and moreover a pack 2 containing 1  is also 
offered. The pack containing 14  is retained but it 
should now be called pack 3, because there are now two 
non-empty, smaller packs. The presence of the two 
smaller packs has given the prospective purchaser more 
choices, and this makes the pricing of the pack contain- 
ing 1  more complicated than it was before. Thus we 
can no longer say that the price of the pack containing 
1  should be 1 . Nevertheless the price, 1 , retains 
the significance that it is the price that customer Z would 
prepared to pay for a pack of size 1  if no smaller 
packs were available and the only other option was to 
buy nothing – the empty pack or pack 0 in our terminal- 
ogy. This limiting price for pack 3 may be denoted , 
where 
1b
2b
4 p
b
4b
4b 4 p
4b
30p 330 1 1
The larger pack, pack x, has not figured in the analysis 
above, so that its existence or otherwise is not relevant. 
This will hold true for customers, X, Y and Z, as long as 
the price of pack x is not below that of the largest of the 
smaller packs. (This can happen on occasion, but rarely 
on a continuing basis, as it contradicts the economic 
principle that more will be preferred to less.) 
4p L p p 
b
p
.  
Generalising, we may observe that if a purchaser, say 
consumer Ω, has a MAP of 1  or more for a pack con- 
taining 1 , has a need or strong desire for the quantity 
contained in pack n, namely , and he chooses to 
ignore any packs between pack 0 and pack n, then the 
retailer may continue offering the smaller packs without 
affecting the valuation, 0n , put on pack n by this pur- 
chaser. Because he has decided to ignore smaller packs, 
person Ω will be prepared to pay  for pack n, given 
by: 
p
  1L n b
np 0
 n0np L 1p                  (3) 
The condition of ignoring packs smaller than pack n 
will be satisfied automatically when n = 1, since, by 
definition, no pack smaller than pack 1 is offered, apart 
from the empty pack, pack 0. Thus putting n = 1 in Equa- 
tion (3) produces the price for pack 1: 
  110 1p L 1p p                (4) 
Now let us consider utility. The utility resulting from 
buying pack n will be  nbu , and the difference, 0nu , 
between the utility of having purchased pack n and that 
of having bought pack 0, i.e. made no purchase, will be 
given by 
  u b
L n


0 b 0n nu u               (5) 
Assume next that the purchase in question was made 
on behalf of a consortium of  people, each of 
whom 
 has a MAP of at least p ; 1 has a need or strong desire for a quantity of the good, 
1b ;  
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 is allotted 1b  from the contents,   1L n b , after pack 
n is purchased. 
If we make the assumption that the utility gain for 
each person in the consortium is the same, then the gain 
in the utility for each consortium member will be 
0 . This will be the same as if that member 
had himself gone out and bought pack 1, as we may con- 
firm by putting n = 1 in Equation (5) to give the total util- 
ity gain from the purchase of pack 1 as: 
   1u b u b
   10 1 0u u b u b                 (6) 
The total utility gain for the consortium of  L n  
people may be found by adding together all the compo- 
nents identified in Equation (6): 
     0 10 10
1 1
1
L n L n
n
i i
u u u L n
 
        10u       (7) 
demonstrating that the utility gain from pack n will be 
proportional to the utility gain from pack 1, with a factor 
of proportionality, . For the utility gain from pack 
n to be proportional to the utility gain from pack 1, then 
the utility differences for the purchasers of pack n and 
pack 1 will obey a very restricted version of homogeneity, 
“singular homogeneity”, as explained in Appendix A. 
 L n
An example of a consortium as described above would 
be 4 university students sharing a house and joining to- 
gether to buy a 4-pint pack of milk a day to be divided 
equally between them. Another consortium could be a 
mother buying the same pack of milk daily for her family. 
On the other hand, an individual living alone and con- 
suming milk at the same rate as one of the students might 
buy a 4-pack of milk every 4 days. In this last case, the 
consortium consists of the individual on day 1 and the 
same individual on days 2, 3 and 4. This generalization 
of the consortium so that it can include time-delayed ver- 
sions of the same individual makes it reasonable to as- 
sume that that every purchaser of pack n experiences the 
same utility gain, 0n , whether part of a multi-person 
consortium or not. This equality in the gain in utility is 
taken to be independent of the price paid for the pack, 
and to be valid in cases where the pack-size ratio is non- 
integer. 
u
Combining Equations (3) and (7), we may write the 
ratio of the changes in utility in terms of the ratio of the 
limiting price for pack n to the achieved price for pack 1: 
0 0
10 1
1n n
u p
n N
u p
               (8) 
But in general there will be packs intermediate be- 
tween pack n and pack 0. In this case, when considering 
the purchase of pack n, in addition to the utility differ- 
ence between pack n and pack 0, the consumer may well 
wish to take into account also the utility differences, 
, , that will arise from comparisons between 
pack n and packs in between pack n and pack 0: 
nku k n
    1nk n ku u b u b k n             (9) 
The change in utility between buying pack n and 
making no purchase may be then be expressed in terms 
of intermediate utility differences: 
           0 0
0
n n n k k
nk k
u u b u b u b u b u b u b
u u
      
   
0
0
 
(10) 
where the last step has made use of Equation (5), replac- 
ing the subscripts, n, and 0 with the subscript, k, as nec- 
essary. Thus the change in utility between purchasing 
pack n and a smaller pack k may be written in terms of 
the utility gains from buying pack n and pack k, respect- 
tively: 
0nk n ku u u                 (11) 
Hence 
0 0 10
0 0 10 0
1nk n n
k k k
u u u u
u u u u
   
1              (12) 
Substituting from Equation (7) with the appropriate 
subscripts into Equation (12) gives 
 
 0 1
nk
k
L nu
k
u L k

0             (13) 
Since    L n L k , it follows that 0nk ku u   will 
always be positive. 
4. Comparing Packs of Different Sizes 
Because they are of the same good, packs may be char- 
acterised by only two quantities, their size and their price. 
But while a single comparison involving multiple packs 
would be feasible if the packs could be characterised by 
just one quantity, when each pack has even as few as two 
characteristic features, it becomes difficult if not impos- 
sible for the consumer to compare packs more than two 
at a time, even when both those characteristics are repre- 
sented numerically. This is exactly the situation ad- 
dressed by mathematics when comparisons are to be 
made between an array of properties, formalised mathe- 
matically as a vector. Generally it is not meaningful to 
say that a vector, x, is bigger than another, y, of the same 
dimension, the only exception being when the vectors are 
linearly related: y x , where   is a constant. In 
every other case, further mathematical operation is 
needed before it is possible to make a meaningful com-  
parison, such as taking the modulus: 2i
i
x x , and  
then comparing the single number x  with the single 
number, y . 
When the packs are characterized by size and price, it 
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is, of course, possible to divide the price by the size to 
give the price per unit. This is normally done in UK su- 
permarkets by the vendor, who is obliged to display the 
result to his customers. But while the prices per unit over 
all n are easily ordered and hence may be compared mul- 
tiply, the unit price does not give a full characterization 
of the pack, for which the size and price are still needed. 
For example, suppose that the price of the standard pack 
containing one unit is £2 and the price of a pack contain- 
ing 10 units is £19, then based on the unit price the larger 
pack is clearly preferable. But the number of units may 
be more than the purchaser needs or the amount of 
money required may be more than the consumer wants to 
lay out on this good, so that actually the consumer will 
prefer pack 1. Hence the role of the price per unit for 
pack n, n , is to add to the features characterizing the 
pack, meaning that the vector of characteristics has risen 
to three: 
 
n
n
L n
p

     
 
strengthening the necessity for pair-wise comparisons. 
Consumers may carry out comparisons over the whole 
range of packs, or they may make an outline decision 
early on in the selection process on the range of packs 
that they judge may meet their desire for the good, B, and 
their budgetary limitations. In each case, the pair-wise 
comparison will be made by taking each pack, pack n, 
within the feasible range, and comparing it with a smaller 
pack, . A price, nk , will emerge from each 
comparison. The consumer is presumed eventually to 
eliminate from consideration all sizes greater than his 
ideal size, and base the price he is prepared to pay for 
this ideal size on the outcome of some or all of the com-
parisons he has made using this pack as his basis. Thus 
the final price for pack n will be a function of the com-
parison-generated prices or a subset of them: 
: 0k k  n

p
 0 1 , 1, , , , ,n n n nk n np g p p p p            (14) 
Thus the set of feasible binary comparisons for pack n 
will be between pack n and the following packs, taken 
one at a time: 
 pack 0 (= the empty pack or no purchase). 
 pack 1. 
  
 pack k. 
  
 pack n – 1. 
At each comparison between pack n and pack k, the 
consumer is presumed to ask himself the question:  
“Suppose I am on the point of agreeing to buy pack k, 
what will it take to make me want to buy the greater 
quantity contained in pack n?” 
He may then reason that the best answer to this ques- 
tion will be found by consulting a mentor with greater 
relevant experience, namely someone who has actually 
bought pack k. This strategy may be characterised as 
“phone a friend”. The mentor has something the con- 
sumer does not: he knows what it feels like actually to 
own pack k. He has knowledge borne of experience, the 
knowledge of possession. 
Let us now consider the perspective of the mentor. As 
a purchaser of pack k, the mentor may be presumed to 
have most of his need satisfied by pack k, which contains  L k  units. Buying pack n in addition will give him    L kL n   units. But  will be significantly 
greater than his original target, , and so those 
 L n  L k L n  units may be presumed to meet his wants in full. 
Hence  L k  units out of the  will now be 
surplus to requirement, and bring the mentor no utility. 
As a result, after purchasing packs k and n, the person 
who originally bought pack k will take the utility gain 
from pack k and n together as equal simply to the utility 
gain from pack n. So in considering whether to buy pack 
n, given that he possesses pack k, the mentor will be pre- 
pared to pay for only the extra utility that pack n adds 
over and above that provided by pack k, that is to say, 
nk
  L L n k
u . We may presume that he would advise the pro- 
spective purchaser accordingly.  
We may further suppose that the prospective purchaser 
of pack n making the comparison with pack k will accept 
the advice of his k-n mentor and take the utility gain from 
pack n as relative to the gain brought by pack k, namely, 
nku . By Equation (11), nku  is the margin between 
the utility gain from of pack n and the utility gained from 
pack k, and this is smaller than the utility gain, 0nu . 
Thus, when the needs or desires of a prospective pur- 
chaser of a commodity are close to being satisfied by a 
pack smaller than pack n, that purchaser will see the ac- 
quisition of pack n bringing him less than its full utility. 
It will be apparent to the reader at this point that the 
prospective purchaser does not actually need to “phone a 
friend” at all. He can work it out for himself simply by 
imagining how he would feel if he had, in fact, bought 
pack k. 
Such an approach is likely to work well with com- 
modities, which are by their nature simple. The demands 
on the consumer’s imagination might become more tax- 
ing with more complex and differentiated goods, where 
real, third-party advice might be needed. But such dif- 
ferentiated goods tend to be sold as one-offs rather than 
in packs, taking away the need for a k-n comparison. The 
vendor may, of course, attempt to provide differentiation 
for goods that many would regard as commodities, and a 
discussion of such situations is given as part of the field 
studies included in [13]. 
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5. Prices Arising from a Binary Comparison  
between Pack n and Pack 1 
If the consumer narrows his final pair-wise comparison 
down to either buying pack n or making no purchase 
(buying pack 0), the price he will be prepared to pay will 
be 0n , as given by Equation (3). This represents the 
case of a consumer with a MAP of at least  who con- 
siders that he has such a strong need for  standard 
units that he is not prepared to take any lesser quantity 
and decides to ignore all packs of intermediate sizes. It is 
this that causes him to value those  units on the 
full utility gain rather than their utility relative to some 
intermediate purchase. 
p
1pL n


L n
It may be, however, that the consumer will grant him- 
self the flexibility to make a comparison between pack n 
and the first pack. Let the price that he is prepared to pay 
for pack n when his comparison is between pack n and 
pack 1 be 1n . We now assume that the price per unit 
gain in utility stays constant for all transactions he is 
considering – a standard economic assumption, e.g. [14]. 
Hence 
p
1 1
1 1
n
n
p p
u u
  0
               (15) 
Meanwhile the ratio of utility differences, 1 10nu u  , 
may be found by putting k = 1 in Equation (13): 
 1
10
1n
u L n
u
                (16) 
Since , the price that the consumer will be 
prepared to pay for pack n, if his comparison narrows 
down finally to the purchase of pack n or pack 1, may be 
found by combining Equations (15) and (16) and also 
using  from Equation (4): 
 1 1L 
10 1p p
 11 1
10
max 1.0, 1nn
up p L n
u
    1p       (17) 
A maximum function has been added in Equation (17), 
embodying the general economic principle that, all other 
things being equal, less will not be preferred to more, and 
so the larger pack will not attract a lower price. (Without 
it, a largeness of , for example, would imply 
that the price of pack n would be lower than that of the 
smaller pack 1. While such a pricing tactic is not un- 
known as a marketing promotion, its use is rarely main- 
tained in the long term, as noted previously.) 
  1.5L n 
Noting that , it will be seen by comparing 
Equations (3) and (17) that the price derived by compare- 
ing pack n with pack 1 cannot be greater than the price 
achieved by comparing pack n with pack 0. Since some 
consumers of pack n are almost certain to make the for-
mer comparison, the retailer will need to accommodate 
the likely lower valuation to some degree, and will set a 
price for pack n that is lower than would be implied by 
proportionality to size. In general, the achieved price, 
n , for any pack, n: n > 1, is almost certain to be less 
than : 
  1L n 
p
0np
0n np p                 (18) 
This provides the theoretical basis for quantity dis- 
counts. 
6. Prices Arising from a General Binary  
Comparison between Pack n and Pack k;  
the Single Comparison Relative Utility  
Pricing Model (SCRUP) 
When the purchase of pack n is being considered relative 
to the purchase of pack k rather than pack 1 the assump- 
tion of constant price per unit utility gained produces 
Equation (19), which is analogous to Equation (15): 
0
nk k
nk k
p p
u u
                 (19) 
where k  is the achieved price for pack k. As noted 
previously in Section 3, the same gain in utility, 0k
p
u , is 
assumed for all purchasers of pack k, as found from 
Equation (5) after substituting k for n.   
Combining Equations (13) and (19) gives the price for 
pack n emerging from the comparison of pack n and pack 
k as: 
 
 max 1.0, 1 1nk k
L n
p p
L k
 
k    
        (20) 
Once again, the maximum function embodies the gen- 
eral economic principle that, all other things being equal, 
less will not be preferred to more, and so the greater 
quantity will not attract a lower price. Equations (20) and 
(3) together give nk  for all , and, of course, 
Equation (20) takes the form of Equation (17) when k = 
1.  
p 0k 
The customer considering buying pack n, of largeness,  
p
L n , will have the following possible prices available 
to him, based on his comparisons with other, smaller 
packs, ranging from the empty pack, pack 0, to the pack 
immediately below pack n in size, namely pack n – 1: 
0 1 ,, , , , ,n n nk n np p p p   1             (21) 
The good in pack n is effectively competing with itself 
contained in smaller packs. The maximum acceptable 
price (MAP) for individual, i, interested in purchasing 
pack n, , will therefore be a function of the prices 
shown in list (21). It is suggested that the dependency 
can be represented by the weighting function: 
 i
n
         
 
0 0 1 1 1 , 1
1
0
i i i i i
n n n k nk n n
n
i
k nk
k
p w p w p w p w p
w p
n 


     
 
 
(22) 
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where ,  are a series of weighting 
factors particular to the individual, which will be subject 
to the conditions: 
 i
kw 0,1, , 1k n  

p p
 
 1
0
0 1
1
i
k
n
i
k
k
w
w


 
                  (23) 
The aggregation of these MAPs will produce a prob- 
ability density for MAP for the target population, which 
will be constrained to the interval, , as 
shown in Appendix B. 
  1 1,np L n p
In considering whether or not to purchase pack n, of a 
commodity, the greatest weight will usually be given to 
the comparison between pack n and the pack just below 
it in size, pack n – 1. In the limiting case where this 
comparison is completely dominant, .   1 1inw  
All other comparisons are now either not made or are 
considered irrelevant. The achieved price for pack n will 
be , 1n n n  when all the prospective purchasers 
adopt this policy. We may describe this as the Single 
Comparison Relative Utility Pricing (SCRUP) model, 
which will be shown to have the power to explain a 
number of everyday pricing strategies the economics of 
which have been understood only poorly until now. 
p p 
7. Using the SCRUP Model to Explain the  
BOGOF and 3-for-the-Price-of-2  
Promotions 
To illustrate the results and the power of the SCRUP 
model, we shall consider first the case of the pricing of 
pack 2, when there is only one pricing comparison that 
can be made, that is to say between pack 2 and pack 1. 
Here n = 2 and k = 1. Let us consider first the case where 
pack 2 holds twice the contents of pack 1 so that 
. If buyers choose to compare the two packs, 
we have, after substituting the appropriate values into 
Equation (20): 
 2 2L 
 21 1 1max 1.0,2 1p            (24) 
This means that if the purchasers of a commodity have 
needs or desires that are close to being satisfied by pack 
1 and so are making a serious comparison between pack 
1 and a pack 2 that is twice the size, then they will be 
prepared to pay only the same for the larger pack as they 
were prepared to pay for the smaller pack. Prima facie 
surprising, this result nevertheless provides a complete 
explanation for why the vendor needs to offer the appar- 
ently generous BOGOF promotion. 
By a combination of technological convenience and 
custom and practice, universal serial bus (USB) memory 
sticks are offered with storage capacities ascending in  
multiples of 2. The lack of novelty associated with the 
lower-capacity sticks means that they are regarded purely 
as commodity item. Hence, by Equation (24), we can 
expect the price of the two lowest-capacity sticks to be 
equal or nearly so. Hence in December 2009, the en- 
try-level 1 Gb USB memory stick was on sale on the 
internet at £6.96, while a 2 Gb stick from the same 
manufacturer was offered at a comparable price—in fact 
slightly lower at £6.44 [15]. This pricing was not a 
one-off, as demonstrated by the pricing, early in August 
2013, of the entry-level pack, now containing 4 Gb of 
memory at £5.79, while the next pack up from the same 
manufacturer, containing 8 Gb, was on sale for almost 
the same price, £6.03. The pricing of such memory sticks 
is considered in more detail in [13]. 
The SCRUP model can also explain immediately a 
perplexing instance of everyday pricing. It used to be 
normal practice in the UK to sell eggs by the dozen, but 
supermarkets have taken to making half a dozen the size 
of pack 1 for “value” eggs. Surprisingly, UK supermar- 
kets no longer sell “value” eggs in packs of a dozen [16].  
But if they did, Equation (24) shows that they would 
find themselves compelled to sell both 6 egg and 12 egg 
packs at the same price, a situation with which they 
would probably not be happy on a continuing basis. In- 
stead major UK supermarkets have taken to selling their 
“value” eggs with a pack 1 set at 6 eggs and a pack 2 
containing either 15 eggs or 18 eggs.  
Considering the case of packs of “value” eggs of 6 and 
18, substituting, n = 1, k = 1 and  into Equation 
(20) produces: 
  32 L
  1121 213,0.1max ppp           (25) 
The achieved price predicted by the SCRUP model for 
pack 2 will be equal to the result of Equation (25), viz. 
1212 2 ppp  . Equation (25) provides the explanation 
for the other common sales promotion: 3-for-the-price- 
of-2. 
Validation for this prediction of the SCRUP model 
comes from the prices charged by one of the UK’s larg- 
est supermarket chains, namely Sainsbury. In that su- 
permarket, a pack of 6 “Basics Barn Eggs” (pack 1) was 
on sale for £0.91 in December 2009, while pack 2, which 
contained 18 eggs, retailed for £1.85 [16]. This is within 
2% of the theoretical figure from Equation (25) of 
82.1£91.0£2  . Further discussion of prices achieved 
will be given in Section 8.3 and, in greater detail, in [13]. 
An example of a quantity offer that the SCRUP model 
makes no claim to explain is the promotion, “Buy one get 
one half price”. How is it that the retailer is able to com- 
mand 1½ times the price for two items, rather than just 
the same price for two items as for one item? In fact, this 
promotion is commonly used in selling paperback books, 
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for example by the large U.K. retailer, W. H. Smith. W. 
H. Smith applies this offer both to fiction and to paper- 
backs on management, economics, business and self-help, 
or to any mixture of the categories. But given that the 
customer is unlikely to buy two of the same book, the 
offer may be seen to concern two complex and different- 
tiated goods, which do not fall within the capability of 
the SCRUP model, as explained at the end of Section 4. 
The interesting feature here is that the retailer has de- 
cided to increase his sales of paperback books by re- 
garding these items as half-way to being commodities, 
and this allows him to use a variant of the promotional 
techniques that apply to retail commodities. 
8. Comparing the Price per Unit from the  
SCRUP Model with the Price per Unit  
from the Iso-Elastic Utility Function 
In this Section we will restrict our attention to the com- 
mon case where the packs increase in size by a constant 
pack size ratio,  . 
8.1. Price per Unit from the SCRUP Model 
In this analysis we will drop the maximum function from 
Equation (20), which may therefore be written in the 
simpler form: 
       1knk
p
p L n L k k
L k
          (26) 
Equations (20) and (26) will give identical results 
when    1 2L n L n    , and dropping the restric- 
tion of the maximum function will allow the exploration 
of inelastic demand. 
The achieved price predicted by the SCRUP model 
will be , 1n n , allowing us to write , 1n n n . Substi- 
tuting n – 1 for k and dividing both sides of Equation (26) 
by the number of units in pack n, , gives: 
p  p p 
 L n
 
 
   1
1
1 2
1
n nL np p n
L n L n L n
       
      (27) 
The price per unit for pack n, n , is: 
 nn
p
L n
                   (28) 
and so Equation (27) may be rewritten: 
 
 1
1 1 11 1n
n
L n
n
L n
 
  
       2      (29) 
Prices per unit relative to the price per unit for pack 1, 
1n   may be found successively from: 
2
1
2
3 32
1 1 2
1
1
 
 
  
   

     
           (30) 
and so on, so that the general expression is 
1
1
1 1
n
n n
 
 
                 (31) 
These per unit price ratios will be valid at the discrete 
points corresponding to the various pack sizes. 
8.2. The Price per Unit from the Iso-Elastic  
Utility Function 
If we assume that the amount of good, B, that may be 
contained in a pack is a continuous variable, b, the gain 
in utility may be modelled by the continuous utility func- 
tion,  u b . The price per unit or price density will now 
also be continuous in b:  b
b
. Hence the cost of buying 
an extra, small amount,  , starting from an initial 
amount, b, will be  b b  . In the case where the quan- 
tity is equal to the amount contained in the starting pack, 
pack 1, then 1b b , and the cost of a further small 
amount, b , will be approximately  1b b  . 
Meanwhile, the extra utility associated with having 
acquired an extra, small amount, b , of B in addition to 
amount, b, will be 
    u b u b b u b               (32) 
Correspondingly, the extra utility associated with a 
small amount, b , of good, B, added to , the contents 
of pack 1, will be 
1b
    1 1u b u b b u b    1           (33) 
The standard relationship between price and marginal 
utility used in Equations (15) and (19) may be extended 
to the case of a continuous quantity, b, so that the ratio of 
Equations (33) and (32) gives: 
 
 
 
 1 1
b b u b
b b u b
  
               (34) 
or 
 
 
     
 
1
1 1
     as 0
b u b u b u b
b
b b b u b
     
      (35) 
An iso-elastic utility function, , giving the utility 
of a continuous quantity, b, has the property that the elas- 
ticity of marginal utility is constant, specifically inde- 
pendent of b.  Pratt [17] and Arrow [18] showed that the 
negative of the elasticity of marginal utility was equal to 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion, 
 u b
 , which we 
shall denote “risk-aversion” for short. Thus 
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      
 
d d d d d
d
u b b u b b u b
b
b b u
       b     (36) 
For an iso-elastic utility function to be smooth and 
regular in risk-aversion, it must take the form [19]: 
 
1 1              for 1
1
ln                   for 1
b
u b
b



    
         (37) 
This has the derivative with respect to b: 
  1 for allu b
b
               (38) 
Combining Equations (35) and (38) gives: 
 
  11  
b b
b b



                  (39) 
If we convert b into standard units, with 1 standard 
unit corresponding to the contents of pack 1: 1 1b  , 
then: 
 
 
1
1
b
b

                   (40) 
The elasticity of demand with respect to price or “de- 
mand elasticity”,  , is the normalised change in quan- 
tity sold with price, given by 
d
d
b b                    (41) 
Applying Equation (41) to Equation (40) shows that 
the demand elasticity,  , is the negative inverse of the 
risk-aversion: 
d
d
b b 1                    (42) 
When risk-aversion, 1 
1
, the demand elasticity will 
take the neutral value,   

, neither elastic nor inelas- 
tic. Furthermore, inspection of Equation (40) shows that 
the locus of   1b  vs. b will be a rectangular hy- 
perbola when 1  .  
Since all packs will be at least as big as the standard, 
entry-level pack, we need consider only that part of the 
curve where . For this sector of the graph, the 
price-ratio curve will lie above the rectangular hyperbola 
when the risk-aversion, 
1b 
 , conforms to 1  , which 
means that the demand elasticity, 1   , and the de- 
mand is elastic. The price-ratio curve will lie below the 
hyperbola when the risk-aversion obeys 1  , signify- 
ing a demand elasticity, 1   , implying inelastic de- 
mand. 
The contents of pack n will be . Hence, noting 
also that b is now denominated in standard units, so that 
, we may set b to: 
1
1
n b 
1 1b 
1nb                     (43) 
The price per unit required to clear 1nb    units of 
the continuous good will be given by substituting Equa- 
tion (43) into Equation (40) 
 
   
1
1
1
1
n
n
 
 

               (44) 
8.3. Equating Prices from the SCRUP and Utility  
Models 
Equating the prices required to clear 1nb    units of 
the continuous good with the price the SCRUP model 
suggests for a pack containing 1n   units means that we 
may equate the right-hand sides of Equations (31) and 
(44): 
11
1 1
nn


 
          
           (45) 
which gives the relationship between risk-aversion,  , 
and pack size ratio,  , as: 
 ln 1
1
ln
 
               (46) 
Equation (46) shows immediately that a continual dou- 
bling of the pack size, viz. 2  , is consistent with a 
risk-aversion, 1  , which will give rise to a logarithm- 
mic utility function, as recommended by H. M. Treasury 
for the evaluation of public-service schemes [20]. As 
demonstrated above, this produces the neutral demand 
elasticity, 1.    Figure 1 shows the plot of risk- 
aversion versus pack-size ratio. 
Meanwhile a risk-aversion, 0  , may be seen to re- 
quire an infinite pack size ratio:    . This may be 
deduced from Figure 1 or directly from Equation (46) 
and verified intuitively by the following argument. The 
impossibility of constructing an infinitely large pack 
corresponding to     means that pack 1 will be the  
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Figure 1. Risk-aversion versus pack-size ratio. 
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only pack. Hence all quantities will be supplied as multi- 
plies of pack 1, implying that the per-unit price will stay 
constant. By Equation (35), an unvarying per-unit price 
means that the slope of the utility function will be con- 
stant so that the utility function must be linear. By in- 
spection, the iso-elastic utility function of Equation (37) 
becomes linear in b only for 0  . 
Equation (46) will not predict a risk-aversion with a 
negative value, 0  . This means that the analysis in 
this Section will include only those who see either con- 
stant or diminishing returns from extra amounts of the 
good, B, and will preclude those who see increasing re- 
turns from extra amounts of the good, B. This does not 
constitute a significant practical limitation, since it is 
assumed generally in economics that the individual will 
perceive diminishing marginal utility from larger 
amounts. 
Amongst those with positive risk-aversions, who 
therefore will see strictly diminishing returns from extra 
amounts of the good, B, let us define as “cautious” those 
with risk-aversions in the range, 0 1  . Cautious 
individuals will always perceive a benefit from more of 
the good, even when the quantity is very high, since their 
utility, , will increase without limit as b increases. 
By contrast, let us call those with a risk-aversion strictly 
greater than unity, 
 u b
1  , “ultra-cautious”. The utility, 
, of ultra-cautious individuals will approach an up- 
per, asymptotic limit as b . Moreover, it is clear 
from Figure 1 that a risk-aversion of greater than unity 
will call for a pack-size ratio of less than 2. Therefore the 
limit contained in Equation (17) will always need to be 
invoked, and even then such ultra-cautious individuals 
will want to pay the same price for all packs, irrespective 
of size. 
 u b

While the vendor may face a market composed of cau- 
tious and ultra-cautious individuals, only the cautious 
consumers will always want more and only the cautious, 
not the ultra-cautious, may be prepared to pay more for a 
larger pack. Therefore it is only the cautious consumers 
whom it is sensible for the vendors to target with quan- 
tity promotions. 
In the absence of more precise information, it is rea- 
sonable to assume a uniform probability distribution for 
risk-aversion amongst the cautious consumers, over the 
open interval, 0 1 
0.5
. The average value of this dis- 
tribution is  
0.5
, and, indeed, the same mean will 
result from any symmetrical distribution over the same 
interval. Thus, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
the figure,   , may be regarded as the risk-aversion 
for the average person likely to be interested in a sales 
promotion offering greater quantities. This value of 
risk-aversion requires from Equation (46) that 
2 1                   (47) 
where   is the golden ratio (see e.g. [21]). (The result is 
easily confirmed from Equation (46) by using Equation 
(47) to replace  ln 1   with ln  and substituting 
2ln 2lln n    . Hence  1 ln   2ln 0.5  .) 
The properties of   mean that when the pack size ratio 
is set to its square, 2 , then the normalised difference in 
size between two successive packs will be equal to the 
golden ratio: 
   
 
1
1
L n L n
L n
               (48) 
We may combine Equations (27) and (47) to show that 
the ratio of the price of pack n to the price of pack n – 1 
will also be equal to the golden ratio: 
1
n
n
p
p


                  (49) 
The value of  , found from solving the quadratic 
equation of Equation (47), is approximately 1.62, so that, 
from the same equation, . 2 2.62 
On this basis, if the vendor is to increase pack sizes by 
a constant ratio,  , within a range of quantities known 
to be desired by cohorts of his customers, the vendor can 
expect to be match his market most accurately if he sets 
the size ratio to the square of the Golden Ratio (Equation 
(47)) and his price ratios at the Golden Ratio (Equation 
(49)). This result will clearly apply to the case where just 
two packs are offered, when the size ratio of pack 2 to 
pack 1 should be the square of the golden ratio and the 
price ratio should equal the golden ratio. The matching of 
the pack size and its prices to the values desired by the 
average customer liable to be tempted by a multibuy of- 
fer means that there is a strong case for regarding Golden 
Ratio sizing and pricing as delivering what the customer 
wants most. 
Figure 2 gives the normalised price per standard unit 
for packs of different sizes when the comparison is al- 
ways made with the pack immediately below (the 
SCRUP model), and when the pack-size ratio,  , stays 
constant. The Figure illustrates the cases where this ratio 
takes the values, 2, 2.5, 2  and 3, and shows how the 
locus derived from iso-elastic utility functions with cor- 
responding risk-aversions 1.0, 0.56, 0.5 and 0.37 respec- 
tively will intersect the discrete data points. Also plotted 
is the locus corresponding to a pack size ratio of 50: the 
risk-aversion, at 0.005, is now close to zero, implying an 
absolutely very large demand elasticity of −200, and a 
price density vs. quantity curve that is nearly horizontal. 
Figure 2 demonstrates that when the pack-size ratio is 
2, the SCRUP Model will predict a price equal to that 
produced by a logarithmic utility function. This corre- 
sponds to the case where a pack containing double the 
quantity will attract the same price as the first pack, as 
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may be seen from Equation (24). The demand elasticity 
is neutral under this condition. The retailer may move the 
market into a region of elastic demand by using a higher 
pack-size ratio, and can expect to achieve better per unit 
prices as a result. However, as illustrated by Figure 2 
and as a moment’s thought will confirm, these higher per 
unit prices will come at the expense of poorer coverage 
of the range of potential purchases. While higher size 
ratios (e.g. a ratio of 3) should give higher per unit prices, 
the square of the golden ratio (~2.62) should offer an 
optimal compromise between higher per unit price and 
coverage of the range of quantities required by consum- 
ers. 
More detail on the prices achieved by major UK su- 
permarkets will be given in [13]. Here we will content 
ourselves with a brief discussion of one result given there, 
concerning “value” eggs where the size of pack 1 was 6 
eggs and the size of pack 2 was either 18 eggs (Sainsbury) 
or 15 eggs (Asda and Tesco) and where pack 1 was re- 
tailing at the same price, £0.91, in all three supermarkets. 
The price per egg achieved by Sainsbury for its 18-egg 
pack 2 was £1.85/18 = £0.103, which is within 2% of the 
theoretical figure of   101.0£1891.0£1618  . 
As noted in the previous paragraph, pack 2 for value 
eggs in Asda and Tesco contained 15 eggs, giving a 
pack-size ratio of 2.5, which is significantly closer to the 
ideal ratio derived above of . By selling pack 
2 at £1.50, these stores achieved a price per egg of 
£0.100 with their pack 2, which is 9% higher than the 
predicted price of 
2 2.62 
  091.00£615  £1591.  . The ideal 
number of eggs in pack 2 based on this theory would be 
 or 16 after rounding. A pack 2 containing 
16 eggs should command a price of  
2 6 15.72  
  52.1£91.0£1616  , giving a price per egg of 
£0.095. The premium price per egg achieved by Tesco 
and Asda with their pack 2 may result from the pack size  
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Figure 2. Effect of pack size ratio on the price per unit. 
satisfying better people’s sense of the most appropriate 
next size up. On the other hand, it may well be that they 
priced their pack 2 based on the price per egg that their 
competitor, Sainsbury, was achieving, and might have 
done better through higher sales by pricing their pack 2 
at   37.1£91.0£1615  . The theory just developed 
suggests that they might have done better still by putting 
16 eggs into their pack 2, which they would then have 
sold at £1.52, since this would have matched the re- 
quirements of the average cautious customer best. 
Interestingly, by August 2013, Tesco was pricing its 
value eggs at £0.87 for a half dozen and £1.35 for 15 [13]. 
Using the SCRUP model, the predicted price for 15 eggs 
would be   31.1£87.01615  . The actual price had 
thus drawn significantly closer to the predicted value—a 
3% difference as opposed to the earlier 9% difference. 
9. The Retailer’s Problem: Choosing the  
Largeness of Pack 2 to Maximise Profit:  
BOGOF vs. 3-for-2 vs. Golden Ratio  
Pricing 
Fundamentally, although the customer will want quantity 
discounts, the retailer will be prepared to offer them if his 
variable costs are low enough for each sale to make a 
non-negative contribution to covering his overall costs. 
The purpose of this Section is to examine the circum- 
stances when the vendor can maximise his profit by set- 
ting the largeness of pack 2 as , as in a BO- 
GOF, when it is best to set it as , as in a 3-for-2 
offer, and when the most profitable strategy might be to 
set the largeness of pack 2 at the square of the Golden 
Ratio, 
 2 2L  2 3L 
  22 2L   .62 . This Section is therefore con- 
cerned with the overall design of pack 2, in terms of both 
size and price. 
9.1. The Optimising Equation 
The exercise of choosing the largeness of pack 2 to 
maximise the vendor’s profits may be treated in a similar 
way to that presented in [11] by using a probability dis- 
tribution to model the maximum acceptable price (MAP) 
amongst those making up the target market. The further 
complication in this case is that the MAP for pack 2 var- 
ies with its largeness. For the cases that we want to con- 
sider, where the pack-size ratio is at least two: 2  , 
the relationship is given by putting n = 2 into Equation 
(27) and rearranging: 
 
   2 1 1
2
1 1
1
L
p p p
L
   2       
      (50) 
where, since  1 1L  , the largeness of pack 2 is identi- 
cal with the pack-size ratio,  2L  . For convenience, 
let us define the price of pack 1 as our base money unit 
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so that 1  and the price of pack 2, 2 , is expressed 
as a multiple of the price of pack 1. Using this system of 
units, we may then simplify Equation (50) into the form: 
1p  p
2 1p 2                 (51) 
The variable cost of pack 1, v , may be expressed in 
terms of the same base unit, the price of pack 1. Assum- 
ing moreover that the income from selling pack 1 will 
cover at least its variable cost,  will lie in the defined 
range: 
c
vc
0 1vc  .0                  (52) 
Since pack 2 contains a factor,  , times the contents 
of pack 1, then the variable cost associated with pack 2 
will be vc , or, using Equation (51), .  12vc p
 dv v
Let the probability density for the MAP for pack 2, 
2 , be . Using the concept of the “uniconsumer” 
introduced without loss of generality in [11] to charac- 
terise a person prepared to buy one but only one item if 
the price is right, the fraction of the uniconsumers pre- 
pared to pay 2  or more for a single pack 2 will be 
, given by 
p
S p
 2h p

 2S p
p

p
2
  2 2
2 0
d 1
mp p
p
h v v h          (53) 
where 2m  is the most that anyone in the target market 
is prepared to pay for pack 2. Those prepared to pay 
more would ideally want a larger pack 2 for their money, 
but it is assumed that they would be content with the 
smaller pack 2, provided it cost less, if that was all that 
was offered. 
Let there be N uniconsumers in the target group. The 
vendor’s total profit, , from selling packs 2 will be his 
total income for pack 2 less both the total variable costs 
and the fixed costs associated with pack 2, 

FC
1 C
: 
    2 2 2 2vp p NS p c p  FNS       (54) 
The retailer will seek to maximise this profit, which, 
for a constant size of target population, N, is equivalent 
to maximising the average profit per consumer,  : 
    22
0
1 1 d
p
F
v v
Cp c c h
N N
       v v  
     (55) 
where use has been made of Equation (53) in the second 
step.   
The maximum value of profit,  , may be found by 
differentiating Equation (55) with respect to pack 2 price, 
2 , and then setting p 2d d 0p  . This gives the opti- 
mal price as the solution, , of 2p
        2 2d 1v vv v p c h p       
2
0
1 1
p
c h   0vc  (56) 
which will be seen to depend on the variable cost associ- 
ated with pack 1, v , and the probability distribution, c 2h p , for pack 2 price, . 2
A limit in the range of risk-aversions is implicit in the 
assignment of the maximum price that anyone would pay 
for a pack 2, 2m , in Equation (53), and it is appropriate 
now to consider the basis for this limit. The maximum 
price, 2m , that anyone is prepared to pay for pack 2, 
will impact on the maximum largeness, 
p
p
p  
max
, via 
Equation (51): 2
2L
1m mp    where m  is the maxi- 
mum pack-size ratio and equal to the maximum largeness 
for pack 2:  
max
. The maximum pack -size 
ratio, m
2Lm  , will imply a lower limit on the risk-aversion 
via equation (46): 
 ln 1
1
ln
m
m
m
 
               (57) 
When he is considering assigning a largeness for pack 
2 of between 2 and 3, we can expect that the vendor will 
have an idea of the maximum size for pack 2 wanted by 
even the consumers possessed of the largest appetite for 
that good. The lowest maximum largeness we can take to 
be 3 (otherwise why would he be considering this as a 
possible size for pack 2?), and twice that figure, namely 
6, would seem to constitute a reasonable estimate of the 
highest maximum largeness in the absence of more pre- 
cise information. Putting 3m   into Equation (57) 
gives a minimum risk-aversion of 0.369m  , while 
inserting 6m   gives m 0.101 
0.101
. In the latter case, 
about 90% of the possible range of risk-aversion for cau- 
tious consumers is covered: 1.0m  . 
9.2. Distributions for Risk-Aversion 
The distribution of risk-aversion has been modelled in 
the first instance as a uniform distribution over the re- 
stricted range: 1.0m   , so that the probability den- 
sity,  g   for risk-aversion,  , is: 
  1 1.0
1 mm
g                (58) 
Meanwhile the probability density for the maximum 
acceptable price (MAP) among the target group for pack 
2, , is given by 2p
    2 2 2
2
d 1
d m
h p g p p p
p
         (59) 
where the relationship between pack 2 price, 2 , and 
risk-aversion, 
p
 , is found by combining Equation (46) 
and (51) to give: 
    
2
2
2
ln 1 ln
ln 1
p p
p
p
   
2             (60) 
Differentiating Equation (60) with respect to  2p
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gives 2d dp : 
  
    
2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2
ln 1 ln 1d
d 1 ln 1
p p p p
p p p p
   
 
       (61) 
The resultant probability distribution,  2h p
6, 0.10
, is 
shown in Figure 3, for the case when 1m   . 
It is clear that the probability density for MAP falls away 
quickly as MAP increases. 
The probability density for risk-aversion,  , has also 
been modelled using the generalised, Double Power den- 
sity [12], which provides an analytically tractable model 
for a variety of smooth distributions with a wide range of 
modes. Let 
1.0m m                  (62) 
so that the minimum value of   is zero, while the 
maximum value, m , of   is 
1m m                   (63) 
The Double Power probability density for   is then 
defined on 0, m   by: 
  0c d mf a b                 (64) 
where, from [12] 
 
 

1
1 1
c
m
c d
a
d c  
                  (65) 
 
 

1
1 1
d
m
c d
b
d c  
                 (66) 
where c and d are free parameters to be specified by the 
user. 
The corresponding probability density,  g  , for   
is then 
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Figure 3. Probability distribution for maximum acceptable 
price for a uniform distribution of risk-aversion with 
m  0.101 . 
       d
d
c d
mg f a b
          m    (67) 
since d d 1    from differentiating Equation (62).   
Putting 1c   and 2d   produces a symmetrical 
distribution on m 1.0   , see Figure 4, where the 
pack-size ratio has been set at 6m   so that 
0.101m  . Applying Equations (59) and (61) gives the 
probability density for MAP for pack 2 given in Figure 5, 
showing how the probability density falls away for high 
values of MAP in a way similar to when the distribution 
is uniform over the same interval. 
Skewed distributions for risk-aversion were produced 
by setting c = 1.0 and varying the parameter, d, in the 
Double Power Equations (65) and (66). Setting 0.4d   
produced a distribution skewed towards less caution,  
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Figure 4. Double power probability distribution of risk- 
aversion when , c = 1, d = 2. m  0.101
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Figure 5. Probability distribution for maximum acceptable 
price for a symmetric double power distribution of risk- 
aversion with , c = 1, d = 2. m  0.101
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with a mode of mode 0.3  , as shown in Figure 6. A 
distribution skewed towards greater caution was found 
by putting , with a resultant mode of mode8d  0.77  . 
See Figure 7. The probability density falls away for high 
values of MAP in both these cases also. 
9.3. The Optimal Largeness of Pack 2 
To facilitate the discussion of the results, we shall intro- 
duce the concept of the generosity of the offer, as meas- 
ured by the price per unit of its contents. The price per 
unit for pack 2, 2 , is given by: 
 
 
   22
2 1 11
2 2
Lp
L L L
    
2
        (68) 
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Figure 6. Double power probability distribution of risk- 
aversion skewed towards less caution; , c = 1, d 
= 0.4. 
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Figure 7. Double power probability distribution of risk- 
aversion skewed towards greater caution; m  0.101 , c = 1, 
d = 8. 
where the price of pack 1 provides the base unit for price 
once again. Hence     22d d 2 1 2 0L L   , imply- 
ing that increasing the largeness of pack 2 will raise the 
per-unit price, thus decreasing the generosity of the offer. 
In these terms, BOGOF is the most generous offer of 
those under consideration and 3-for-2 is the least. 
We may also note that the vendor will wish to cover 
at least the variable costs in any long-term offer. The 
money brought in per sale of pack 2 will be  2 2 1p L  , while the variable cost associated with 
pack 2 will be  2vc L . Hence covering the variable cost 
of pack 2 requires that    2 1 2 0vL c L    or 
  12
1 v
L
c
                  (69) 
Turning now to the problem of maximising profits, a 
solution may be found for the optimising Equation (56) 
in terms of v . The equation may be solved iteratively 
by first assigning a value to the optimal pack price, 2 , 
and then finding the variable cost, v , associated with 
pack 1 that reduces the left-hand side of the equation to 
zero. (The reverse process of fixing v  and finding the 
corresponding value of 2  is equally valid, but tends to 
be less well conditioned.) The optimal largeness may 
then be found from the golden ratio, Equation (48), not- 
ing that 
c
p
c
c
p
 2L  . 
Figure 8 shows the optimal largeness, , of pack 
2 versus the variable cost, v , associated with pack 1 for 
four distributions for risk-aversion. It plots additionally 
the largeness of pack 2 needed to cover the variable cost 
(Equation (69)), which provides a base line. Clearly 
when 
 2L
c
0.5vc  , selling 2 for the price of 1 (BOGOF) 
will cost 1 standard unit and bring in 1 standard unit, so 
that the variable cost of pack 2 is only just covered. 
When 0.66vc 7 , selling 3 for the price of 2 (BOGOF) 
will cost 2 standard units and bring in 2 standard units, 
just covering the variable cost of pack 2 again. Similar 
calculations will apply for all offers in between. 
Let us consider the profit-maximising offer based on 
the assumption that the population follows a symmetrical 
Double Power probability density for risk-aversion with 
a lower level of 0.369m   by the assumption that   
max
2L 3 . From Figure 8, the largeness offered when  
0.5vc   is just less than 2.3, which is less generous than 
the largeness of 2.0 which would just cover the variable 
costs. A largeness of 2.3 can sustain a profit because 
there are sufficient consumers in the target population 
prepared to pay 1.3 standard units or more for an appro- 
priately sized pack 2. When , the optimal 
largeness has gone up to 2.65, which may be compared 
with the largeness of 2.5 needed to cover variable costs. 
A largeness of 2.65 can be sustained because there are 
still enough consumers “left in” prepared to pay 1.65 
standard units for the appropriately sized pack 2. The 
0.6vc 
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margin between the optimal largeness and the variable- 
cost-covering largeness has now reduced, however. This 
margin disappears altogether when the variable cost rises 
to , when the optimal largeness of 3 will 
bring in only enough money to cover the variable costs. 
Figure 8 demonstrates how the optimal largeness asso- 
ciated with the Uniform distribution converges to the 
same point as that associated with the Double Power 
distribution. This convergence will be independent of 
the precise form of the distribution of risk-aversion 
above the lower limit of 
0.667vc 
0.369m   that is consequential 
on  
max
largeness to a less generous value above 3, there will be 
no consumer prepared to pay the correspondingly higher 
price, which would be more than 2 base units. 
2L 

3 . While the vendor might want to set his  
The vendor’s plight will be eased if there are more 
people with lower risk-aversions in the target population. 
Thus when 
max
 and so 2  6L 0.101m  , the ven- 
dor will be able to set his largeness at less generous, 
higher values throughout the range. Thus he will be able 
to assign pack 2 a largeness of 3 for a variable cost, 
v , for the symmetrical Double Power density 
and for a variable cost, , for a Uniform distri- 
bution over the same range. 
0.59
 
c
0.50vc 
Based on Figure 8, we may state generally that, if the 
vendor expects to be able to sell a 3-for-2 offer, so that 
max
, and requires that at least his variable costs 
should be covered, then the variable cost, v , associated 
with pack 1 must be at or below 66.7% of its selling price. 
More generally, a multibuy offer that is at least as gen- 
erous as 3-for-2 cannot be profitable unless: 
2L  3
67
c
0 0.6vc               (70) 
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Figure 8. Optimal largeness of pack 2 vs. variable cost for 
Uniform and Double Power (DP) distributions for risk- 
aversion, with  L 
max
2 3  and  L 
max
2 6 . Also shown 
is the locus of the lowest largeness needed to cover the 
variable cost of pack 2. 
Figure 9 compares the effects of skewing the symmet- 
rical Double Power distribution for risk-aversion towards 
lower caution and towards greater caution. The minimum 
risk-aversion is 0.101m   in all three cases. The effect 
of a more cautious population of consumers is to lower 
the optimal largeness at any given v , while the optimal 
largeness of pack 2 increases when the population is less 
cautious. 
c
Pinpointing the optimal largeness for pack 2 requires a 
knowledge of both v  and the distribution of risk-aver- 
sion in the target population. While v  may be deter- 
mined accurately, the vendor is unlikely to know the ex- 
act form of the latter. It is argued in [19] that risk-aver- 
sion stays constant during any decision (whether to buy 
or not, in this instance), but nevertheless risk-aversion 
will vary with the importance of the decision. See also 
[22]. It is also likely to vary from person to person, de- 
pendent on both temperament and personal wealth. In the 
absence of more precise information, it is necessary to 
employ a range of credible distributions, leading to a 
plausible range of optimal largeness for a given variable 
cost, . 
c
c
c
v
The interval for v  for which it is sensible to consider 
multibuy offers in the range,  is given by 
condition (70). If the retailer is to restrict for simplicity 
his selection of the size and hence price of pack 2 to a 
ternary choice between BOGOF, Golden Ratio Pricing 
and 3-for-2, then, based on Figures 8 and 9, the follow- 
ing approximate v  ranges are appropriate for the three 
possible values of largeness for pack 2: 
c
 2 2L  3
c
 
 
 
2
0.0 0.4, 2 2.0
0.4 0.6, 2 2.62
0.6 0.667, 2 3
v
v
v
c L
c L
c L

  
   
  
       (71) 
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Figure 9. Optimal largeness of pack 2 vs. variable cost for 
Double Power distributions for risk-aversion, with  L 
max
2 6  
with c = 1 and d = 0.4 (less cautious), d = 2 (symmetric), and 
d = 8 (more cautious). 
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The curves suggest that the BOGOF provides the 
closest approach to optimality over roughly the lower 
three fifths of the range of variable cost where any of the 
three multibuy offers is able to generate a profit. The 
Golden Ratio will then be the best of the three offers in 
roughly the next three tenths of the profitable range of 
v , with 3-for-2 becoming the optimal selection in 
roughly the highest decile. The boundaries suggested 
here are all approximate, as is clear from Figures 8 and 9, 
and should be regarded as indicative only.  
c
Clearly if the entry pack contains a single, discrete 
item (a white shirt, for example), then fractional quanti- 
ties, as implied by the Golden Ratio offer, will be impos- 
sible. Hence the vendor will need to adopt either a BO- 
GOF or a 3-for-2 as an approximation.  
The analysis suggests that the generous BOGOF can 
be justified on pure economic grounds only when the 
variable cost is below about 40% of the selling price of 
pack 1. On the other hand, BOGOF will be attractive to 
the most cautious of the target market of cautious con- 
sumers, namely those with a risk-aversion, 1  , and an 
offer that attracts the most cautious of the cautious con- 
sumers will also be attractive to rest. The BOGOF is thus 
ideal for eye-catching promotions that will appeal to all 
consumers who can be tempted by a multibuy offer. 
However, it should be offered on a temporary basis only 
unless the variable costs are low. 
10. Conclusions 
At a time when legal restrictions on quantity promotions 
are being given serious consideration in the UK, it is vital 
to have a proper understanding of multibuy promotions 
such as BOGOF. The theory of Relative Utility Pricing 
(RUP) developed in this paper takes account of the reac- 
tion of the customers to provide a quantitative economic 
explanation not only for supermarket promotional offers, 
but also for more general pricing of packs of different 
sizes in supermarkets and on the internet.  
Grounded in standard economic thinking, the RUP 
model allows the derivation of a general formula that 
explains clearly and simply for the first time the two 
most widely used quantity promotions: BOGOF and 
3-for-the-price-of-2. It also provides a general explana- 
tion for why the price of a pack 2 that contains twice the 
amount of a commodity as the entry level pack, pack 1, 
may need to be priced exactly the same to sell.  
The paper has linked the RUP model to the theory of 
iso-elastic utility functions, allowing the relationship 
between risk-aversion and pack-size ratio to be stated. 
The same theoretical development also allows a simple 
relationship to be set down between risk-aversion and the 
demand elasticity for the product in question.  
Successive doubling of pack sizes has been shown to 
correspond to a logarithmic utility function, where the 
risk-aversion is unity. This is associated with a neutral 
demand elasticity, viz. 1   . Finite pack-size ratios 
greater than 2.0 are suitable for individuals with a 
risk-aversion value that lies above zero but no higher 
than unity – cautious consumers. They are also associ- 
ated with a lower (more negative) values of demand elas- 
ticity: 1   , which implies elastic demand.  
Cautious consumers are shown to be the only sensible 
target for quantity promotions. There is no asymptotic 
limit to their gain in utility from additional quantities of a 
good, and they may be prepared to pay more for larger 
packs. Satisfying the desires of the average cautious 
consumer will result in a ratio of successive pack sizes 
equal to the square of the golden ratio, namely 2.62, 
while the price-ratio will be the golden ratio, 1.62. It is 
arguable that this pair of ratios is necessary in order to 
best satisfy the needs of consumers. Thus the golden ra-
tio may be regarded as a marketing tool that vendors 
should consider using in the interests of their customers. 
Golden Ratio Pricing can also be in the best interests 
of the vendor, as shown by an analysis of profit maximi- 
sation in the presence of the consumer attitudes reported 
in the paper. Promotions ranging from BOGOF through 
Golden Ratio Pricing to 3-for-the-price-of-2 can be prof- 
itable only if the variable cost of pack 1 is less than two 
thirds of the price of that pack. But higher profits are 
likely to come from Golden Ratio Pricing than from ei- 
ther BOGOF or 3-for-2 when variable costs as a fraction 
of pack 1 price lie in most of the upper half (~0.4 to ~0.6) 
of the range required to generate profit from any of these 
multibuy offers. 
The RUP model has been applied to the prices of gro- 
ceries, where it has been able to illuminate the pricing 
structure for “value” eggs in supermarkets. A significant 
degree of validation of the model comes from the close- 
ness of its predictions both for pack size and price. 
The application of the RUP model to the electronics 
sector has explained the non-obvious prices of USB 
memory sticks of increasing capacity. Linked to the bi- 
nary system at the heart of every computer, the ingrained 
practice of the silicon chip industry to double the capac- 
ity of its products each year is enshrined in the influential 
Moore’s Law [23]. This has the beneficial side-effect for 
the consumer that the price of the new product that is 
twice as fast or has twice the storage capacity as the old 
will settle down at the old price. Undoubtedly this has 
produced great benefits to the consumer. Although prima 
facie the practice may not be ideal for the vendor, it will 
be a driver for the exceptionally high rate of technologi- 
cal progress observed in the memory industry. Manufac- 
turers are pressured to create higher capacity products 
due to the previous generation’s prices quickly descend- 
ing to commodity rates and thus returning low profits. 
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Hence, the RUP model has explained the structure of 
quantity promotions, in terms of both the sizes of packs 
and the prices. Different packs should be able to com-
mand. This new theory should be of interest and value to 
vendors, consumers and regulators. 
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Appendix A. Singular Homogeneity 
Consider the following transformation between two func- 
tions: 
   2 1 for all numbers,H mx mH x m     (A.1) 
The function,  1H x2
, may be seen to be transformed 
into the function, H mx , by multiplying both its input, x, and its output, 1H x , by the constant, m. Now sup- 
pose that  is a homogeneous function of degree 
one. In this case, by the property of first-degree homoge- 
neity: 
 1 .H
   1 1 for all numbers,H mx mH x m      (A.2) 
Linear operators possess this property of homogeneity 
of degree one. Comparing Equations (A.1) and (A.2), it is 
clear that if  is a homogeneous function of degree 
one, then the second operator will be the same as the first: 
.  
 1 .H
 . .H H 2 1
Now consider Equation (7), which may be written in 
terms of a continuous variable for extent, x, as: 
      0 10 0nu L n x L n u x x b    1     (A.3) 
By Equation (A.3), the function, , may be 
transformed into the function, , by multiplying 
both the input, x, and the output, , by the con- 
stant, . Clearly Equation (A.3) bears a similarity to 
Equation (A.1), but it differs in the fact that Equation 
(A.3) applies only for the single value of m: 
 10 .u .  10u x0n
u
 L n
 m L n . 
Hence we may describe Equation (A.3) as having the 
property of “singular homogeneity”. 
Under singular homogeneity,  and  0 .nu  10 .u  
will be different, nonlinear functions, except for the lim- 
iting case when  is linear in its argument. Such a 
situation will occur only when risk-aversion is zero, when 
the risk-neutral utility function emerges. (This contention 
becomes evident after substituting 
 10 .u
0   into equations 
(A.5) and (A.6) below. At this point, the function, 
, has become homogeneous of degree 1, because 
the utility function is linear in its argument.) 
 10 .u
An alternative but equivalent formulation of Equation 
(A.3) arises after replacing the extent variable, x, by a 
new variable of extent, b, where  so that  b L n x x b L n . Then equation (A.3) becomes: 
       0 10 0n
bu b L n u b L n b
L n
         1
   (A.4) 
As an example, let us assume a pack-size ratio, 3  , 
as used by Sainsbury for its value eggs. From Equation 
(46), the matching risk-aversion is 0.369  . Using the 
utility function given in Equation (37) to represent the 
utility that the person will gain from using the contents of 
pack 1 containing an amount, , of good, B, we achieve, 
after noting that : 
1b 1 1L 
  1 1 0.63110 11 1 1.585 01 1 1
b bu b b b b
 
  
          
(A.5) 
Meanwhile the utility of that the person or consortium 
of people will gain from using the contents of pack n may 
be found by combining Equations (A.4) and (A.5) to give 
        
    
1 1
0
0.369 0.631
1
1
1 1
1.585 0
n
b bu b L n L n
L n
L n b b L n b
 
 
        
  
 (A.6) 
Figure 10 shows the utility gain from pack 1, 10u , 
and that from pack 2, 20u , plotted against the amount 
of the good, B, measured in standard units of the contents 
of back 1, so that 1 1b   and 2 . These graphs 
might represent the case of one person buying pack 1 
containing 6 eggs and a family unit of three buying pack 
2 containing 18 eggs. The final utility gain for the indi- 
vidual, at b = 1, will be 1.585, while the final utility gain 
for the family of three will be 3 × 1.585 = 4.755, at b = 3 
standard units. The right-hand arrows on the graph show 
how this result may be derived by multiplying by the 
factor, 
3b 
 2 3L  , both the x and the y co-ordinates asso- 
ciated with the complete consumption of pack 1.   
Because Equation (A.3) has been formulated in con- 
tinuous terms, we may apply the same transformation 
within the contents of pack 1. Hence we may take the 
case where the individual has used 1/6 of his pack 1, one 
egg in this case, and multiply each of the co-ordinates of 
10u , namely (0.167, 0.51) by a factor of three to give 
the corresponding co-ordinates (0.5, 1.53) of 20u . 
These show that the utility gained by the family of three 
in consuming half a standard unit, that is to say 3 eggs, is 
three times greater than that achieved by the single per- 
son eating one egg. The smaller arrows on the left-hand 
side of the graph indicate the graphical process. 
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Figure 10. Graphical analysis of singular homogeneity. 
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Appendix B. The Range of Maximum  
Acceptable Price (MAP) for Pack n 
But, by Equation (3), 0 20n , so that we may sim- 
plify the right-hand side of condition (B.7) to: 
p p
 20 0 20 0max , np p p p B.1 The Highest MAP for Pack n n            (B.8) 
Comparing Equations (3) and (17), it is clear that the 
price, 1n , resulting from a comparison of pack n and 
pack 1 will be no greater than the price arising by com-
paring pack n with pack 0: 
p
Substituting from condition (B.8) into condition (B.6), 
the price arising from the comparison of pack n with pack 
2 will obey: 
2 0 for 2n np p n                (B.9) 
1 0 for 1n np p n             (B.1) If we put n = 3 into Equation (22), the MAP for pack 3 
emerges as It should be emphasised here that the comparison price, 
nk , arising from comparing pack n with smaller packs 
will depend on the value of pack largeness and the 
achieved prices of for the lower packs, but not on the 
opinion of the individual, allowance for which comes 
from the weightings, . 
p
 i
kw
       
3 0 30 1 31 2 32
i i i ip w p w p w p          (B.10) 
Since by condition (B.1), 31 30 , and by condition 
(B.7), 
p p
32 30p p , the highest value of any individual’s 
MAP, , will occur when ,  3ip 0w 1 1 0w   and 
2 0w  , so that Putting n = 2 into Equation (22) gives the individual’s 
MAP for pack 2 as  
3 30 for all
ip p i
30
           (B.11)      
2 0 20 1
i i ip w p w p             (B.2) 
Moreover, since , it follows that the achieved 
price for pack 3, , will obey 
 
3 3
ip p
3pBy condition (B.1), 21 20 , and so, from equation 
(B.2), the highest value of the MAP, , for any 
individual will occur when that person sets 
p p  
2
ip p  
0
iw
20
1  and 
.  Hence we may write:  1 0iw 
3p p                  (B.12) 
where, from equation (3), 
 30 13p L p
i
p
               (B.13)  
2 20 for all
ip p i
0
           (B.3) 
It is clear that this process may be continued indefi- 
nitely, so that for any pack, , the upper limit of 
MAP will be defined by 
1n 
The achieved price, 2 , must be less than or equal to 
the highest MAP in the customer cohort, and so it follows 
that 
p
 
0 for all
i
n np p            (B.14) 2 2p p                  (B.4) 
where, from Equation (3), In other words the upper limit, , for MAP for 
pack n is given by: 
maxnp
 20 12p L p               (B.5)  max 0 1n np p L n            (B.15) We may now consider the highest MAP for pack 3. 
Putting k = 2 into Equation (20) and then using condition 
(B.4) gives the price of pack n coming from a comparison 
with pack 2 as: 
B.2 The Lowest MAP for Pack n 
 
 
 
   
       
 
2 2
1
1 1
20 0 20
max 1.0, 1
2
max 1.0, 1 2
2
max 2 , 2
max , 2
n
n
L n
p p
L
L n
L p
L
L p L n L p
p p p n
     
     
 
 
A price for pack n, n , equal to the price of the next 
lowest pack, 1n
p
p  , is possible, as demonstrated by the 
buy-one-get-one-free promotion and as explained above. 
However, bearing in mind the economic principle that 
more will be preferred to less, we may presume that the 
vendor will not allow the price, n , of pack n to fall 
below the price, 
p


      (B.6) , of pack n – 1. 1np 
The lower price that the vendor would countenance, 
1n np p  , will have the effect that any potential cus- 
tomer for pack n who has a MAP lower than 1np   will 
exclude himself from the cohort of customers of interest 
to the retailer. Thus the lowest MAP for pack n will be 
simply the price, 1np  , of the pack next down in size: 
where Equation (B.5) has been used twice in the devel- 
opment. Clearly, for any strictly positive values,  
: 20 0, np p
min 1np p n                 (B.16)   20 0 20 20 0max , max ,n np p p p p        (B.7) 
 
